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In a previous article (Axmacher, 2013) I argued that neuroscientific and psychoanalytic
explanations are in general epistemologically consistent with each other, even if psychoanalytic
claims refer to (typically unconscious) reasons, whereas neuroscientific claims are about causes.
I claimed that hermeneutic (psychoanalytic) explanations are not inconsistent with causal
(neuroscientific) explanations even if they are typically given as “deferred reconstructions”–in
other words, as post-hoc explanations of feelings, symptoms or behavioral patterns that initially
appear irrational, random and senseless. Specifically, I claimed that psychoanalytic explanations—
like (neuro)scientific explanations—are successful if and only if they can determine the sufficient
conditions which give rise to the feeling, symptom, or behavioral pattern in question.
I was pleased to see that Dr. Elisa Galgut has critically discussed my argument from the point of
view of Donald Davidson’s anomalous monism (Galgut, 2014). She argues that there are no general
psychological laws that are comparable to laws in the natural sciences: “a central difference between
psychological explanations, and causal explanations in the sciences, is that the latter, but not the
former, appeal to generalizable laws.”: “We can cite causes and effects of particular psychological
events, but we can never cite the law under which these events are subsumed, because there are no
psychological laws.” In particular, the list of possible boundary conditions on psychological laws
is in principle infinite, so that there may always be exemptions from them. By contrast, according
to her view this is not the case for causal explanations in the sciences, where the list of boundary
conditions is limited. In propositional psychology “The set of disjunctives is open-ended as amatter
of principle, whereas this is not the case in the physical sciences.”
I think that Davidson can be understood as arguing that physical laws are “stricter”
than psychological laws because explanations in commonsense psychology—as well as in
psychoanalysis—typically refer to propositional states such as desires, wishes, or conflicts (that
result from several incompatible wishes). Propositional states are representations, which have
several important properties: The link of representations to their contents is “looser” than the
link between non-representational physical states or events (e.g., because changes in contents may
not necessarily be accompanied by changes of the corresponding representations). Furthermore,
representations are “holistic” in the sense that changes in one representation affect the entire
network of representations.
I agree with Davidson (and Galgut) on these points. However, as we will see below,
explanations in cellular neurosciences, cognitive neurosciences and psychoanalysis may also refer
to representations, and therefore this is not a distinguishing property between neuroscientific and
psychoanalytic explanations.
My argument is less philosophical than it is empirical: Even after excluding some outdated
candidates, there are many theories about how causation and causal explanation should be
conceived of (probably about as many as there are philosophers who discussed this topic). So, how
do we know which one of the many current theories on this question is correct? I suggest to adopt
a perspective similar to the one in the social sciences and to investigate which explanations are
currently indeed used in neurosciences and in psychoanalysis.
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As I have argued, psychoanalytical explanations (or, more
generally, psychological explanations) share—if they are
successful—the logical structure of neuroscientific explanations
(as a specific kind of explanations in the physical sciences) in a
specific respect. They are true if and only if the occurrence of
an explanans (a cause or a reason) invariably leads to a specific
effect: the explanans needs to be sufficient for the effect. (Notably,
I do not believe that the truth of psychoanalytic or neuroscientific
explanations requires that an explanans be necessary for an effect:
In the absence of one specific cause or reason, other causes or
reasons may lead to the same effect, and the explanation may still
be valid. This implies over-determinism, which I agree weakens
the explanatory power of neuroscientific or psychoanalytic
explanations. But this is all we have—and explanations in
terms of sufficient conditions are very important in all curative
disciplines like medicine or psychotherapy, because they describe
what needs to be done in order to reach a certain effect).
In both neuroscientific and psychoanalytic explanations
related to representations, the relationship between an explanans
and an effect is typically only true if a number of boundary
conditions obtain as well. These conditions, as Galgut says,
often cannot be spelled out—this again seriously weakens the
explanatory power in the neurosciences and in psychoanalysis,
but, again, this is all we have. If scientific laws related to
representations are not based on an exhaustive list of conditions
under which they are valid or invalid—if they only indicate some
sufficient conditions which, under specific boundary conditions,
lead to an effect—how are they generated? Typically, such
laws are based on an observation of some regularity (e.g.,
a correlation) and then use clever experimental designs to
manipulate individual factors or conditions as specifically as
possible (i.e., without changing other factors).
In the following, I will describe examples from the
neurosciences (as one example of a “physical science”),
from cognitive neuroscience research (that attempts to bridge
psychology and neuroscience), and from psychoanalysis that all
refer to representations. From these descriptions, it will become
apparent that such laws are always preliminary suggestions
for general relationships built on an incomplete knowledge
of boundary conditions. Such weak and preliminary laws
are all we have to explain the world, though, and they do
not differ systematically between neuroscience, psychology, and
psychoanalysis.
Let’s start with neuroscience. To take an example for which
last year’s Noble prize in Medicine or Physiology was awarded,
the activity of “place cells” in the hippocampus was found to
correlate with the spatial location of an animal (O’Keefe and
Dostrovsky, 1971). Subsequent research identified the boundary
conditions of place cell activity at an impressive degree of
detail. Now, the brain (similar to the mind) is a complex inter-
connected system, and manipulating one factor often influences
other processes as well. Thus, the art of experimental research
consists in specifically manipulating only one factor at a time,
and leaving all others equal. Moreover, knowledge of the brain
(and of the mind) is incomplete and fragmentary, and therefore
one can only speculate about the possible influences that specific
brain processes exert on others—and on all the boundary
conditions that need to be met so that place cells can do their
job properly. However, this does not mean that no relevant
lawful relationships can be found—one is saying something
relevantly general and lawful in saying that hippocampal place
cells represent spatial locations in various animals (including
bats, in whom they are three-dimensional), andmuch about their
properties, development, and functional role has been found out
in the last decades.
The situation is quite similar in the cognitive neurosciences,
in which psychological processes or properties are explained
by brain mechanisms. For example, the capacity of the human
working memory store—a psychological concept—is generally
limited to something between 3 and 7 items (depending on
the metric used). According to one influential theory, this
capacity corresponds to the frequency ratio of fast and slow
brain oscillations (Lisman and Idiart, 1995). This theory suggests
that each cycle of a fast oscillation represents one single item
and occurs super-imposed on a specific phase range of a slow
oscillation cycle. The more fast cycles fit onto one slow cycle,
the more items someone can keep in working memory. Now,
this theory is far from being proven, and may actually turn
out to be incorrect. However, this is not because the list of
boundary conditions for this relationship still needs to be clearly
defined, which will very likely never be the case. In general, with
the increasing application of multivariate pattern classification
analyses, neural representations of specific experiences and
concepts can be traced in the brain. Again, these representations
are loosely coupled to their content and they are holistic,
but that exactly corresponds to the properties of propositional
states.
Finally, what about psychoanalysis? The concept of repression
is central to psychoanalytic theory and practice and has
therefore been a matter of intense investigations, both in the
clinical interaction between psychoanalyst and patient and in
“extraclinical” experimentation. We have recently adopted free
association paradigms similar to those initially conducted by
Jung (1918) and investigated memory to either standardized or
individualized (autobiographic) conflict sentences (which were
derived using “Operationalized Psychodynamic Diagnostics”,
OPD-Task-Force, 2008). Consistent with psychodynamic theory,
free associations to conflict sentences were accompanied by
indirect measures of resistance (longer reaction times) and
autonomic arousal (higher skin conductance responses) and were
less likely to be remembered afterwards, potentially indicating
repression (Kehyayan et al., 2013; Schmeing et al., 2013).
Even though we are far from a complete understanding of
all factors influencing these relationships, we believe that our
findings operationalize and explain at least some important
aspects of repression, and could become clinically relevant to
dissociate the various (meta-)psychological and brain processes
underlying repression. Notably, “reasons” for repression in the
context of our paradigms (i.e., the relationship of cue words
or sentences to intrapsychical conflicts) would explain behavior
strictly analogous to causes in neuroscientific approaches to
representations.
Now, are these mundane examples really examples of
“scientific laws” in the sense that Galgut is referring to? After all,
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they constitute only tentative and relatively specific relationship
between certain events and properties, will potentially be falsified
and very likely be replaced one day by better, more encompassing
relationships. They are certainly less strict than laws in the
physical sciences which do not relate to representations.
However, when representations come into play, they are all we
have to explain neuroscientific, psychological, and (as a special
case of psychological) psychoanalytic observations. With regard
to psychoanalysis, such relationships provide the cornerstone
of psychoanalytic metapsychology. In fact, metapsychological
theories are typically derived from empirical observations: In
Freud’s case, from 19th century physiology, such as Helmholtz’s
laws, which set the basis for the “constancy principle”; in modern
psychoanalysis, from various sources including the affective
neurosciences, which may be about to radically change the
way we think about the mental apparatus (Solms, 2013). The
fact that existing psychoanalytic concepts are already intimately
intermingled with concepts from the empirical sciences provides
clear practical evidence against the purported “inconsistency”
between these areas of science (see Flores Mosri et al., 2015).
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